Why the M1911 is the most dominant pistol of the 20th century

Undergraduate Textual or Investigativ

Psychiatry beyond the brain: externalism, mental health, and autistic spectrum disorder

Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we apply a strongly externalist approach to the case of Autistic Spectrum Disorder, and argue that this condition can be illuminated by appeal to the hypothesis of extended cognition. We conclude by briefly considering the significance this strongly externalist approach may have for psychiatric practice and pedagogy

Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Frontiers Media via the DOI in this record

A Breath of Fresh Air: Absence and the Structure of Olfactory Perception.

types: ArticleThe question of whether we can perceive absences, in addition to 'positives', has received recent attention in the literature on the nature of vision and audition. The aim is to demonstrate that there can be objectless forms of perceptual consciousness; specifically, to show that such episodes can be distinguished from those in which there is merely no perception at all. The current paper explores this question for the domain of olfaction, and argues that there can be experiences of the absence of odours, in addition to positive smell perception. Doing so sheds light upon the structure and spatial content of olfaction

The Rhetoric of Reader\u27s Theatre

Mr. Johnny Aiken of Denver University has called it A form of oral interpretation in which all types of literature may be projected by means of characterized readings enhanced by theatrical effects. Among the myriad of definitions of theatre\u27s estranged art known as Reader\u27s Theatre, this one seems to sum up my philosophy of what it actually is. In this paper, I propose to take three steps in establishing what I believe is the true rhetoric of Reader\u27s Theatre. Firstly, I want to enhance an agreeable definition which I have partially done thus far. Secondly, I want to discuss the long disputed question of what the interpreter\u27s rightful role in Reader\u27s Theatre should be. And finally, clarify the most recent philosophy of the position of locus in Reader\u27s Theatre

Letter, 1979 April 25, from Tom Roberts to Eva Jessye

1 page, Roberts was the News Director for WREN Broadcasting, Inc. The Kansas Report is mentioned

Extending Emotional Consciousness

types: ArticleRecent work on extended mind theory has considered whether the material realizers of phenomenally conscious states might be distributed across both body and world. A popular framework for understanding perceptual consciousness in world-involving terms is sensorimotor enactivism, which holds that subjects make direct sensory contact with objects by means of their active, exploratory skills. In this paper, I consider the case of emotional experience, and argue that although the enactivist view does not transfer neatly to this domain, there are elements of emotional consciousness whose physical underpinnings include parts of the extra-bodily environment

I can't believe it's not lexical: Deriving distributed veridicality

Given the assumption that selection is a strictly local relationship between a head and its complement, we expect the ability of a head to take a particular argument to be insensitive to linguistic material above that head. The verb believe poses a puzzle under this view: while believe ordinarily only permits declarative clausal complements, interrogative complements are allowed when believe occurs under clausal negation and can or will, and a veridical reading becomes available. I argue that this provides evidence that believe is not simply a standard Hintikkan representational belief verb, but rather is fundamentally question-embedding,and that the verb's lexical semantics, including an excluded middle presupposition, interact with the modal and negation to derive the veridicality of can't believe. I conclude that veridicality need not be lexical: the right mix of semantic ingredients can conspire to yield a veridical interpretation, even if those ingredients are distributed across multiple lexical items